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This thesis is an investigation into the measurement and
analysis of the relationship between defense contractor risk
and profit levels as compared to commercially oriented
firms' risk and profit levels. Past studies that have
attempted to quantify the interrelationship of risk and
profit are examined. Hurdle's leverage, risk, market
structure, and profitability model is used as a basis for
the current model of risk and profitability. Empirical
analyses of defense contractor risk and profit relationships
are performed using least squares regression analysis, Chow






II. MARTIN AND HURDLE ANALYSIS OF RISK AND PROFIT 10
A. MARTIN ANALYSIS 10
B. HURDLE ANALYSIS — 11
C. EQUATIONS 15
D. HURDLE'S CONCLUSIONS 16
III. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 17
A. THE DATA 17
B. METHODOLOGY 21
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 23
A. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION 23
B. CHOW TEST ON STRAIGHT LINE REGRESSION 2 6
C. THREE STAGE REGRESSION EQUATIONS 27
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ^4
APPENDIX 36
LIST OF REFERENCES 55
BIBLIOGRAPHY 56
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 57
LIST OF TABLES
1. SAMPLE OF 24 COMMERCIALLY-ORIENTED CONTRACTORS 18
2. SAMPLE OF 13 DEFENSE ORIENTED CONTRACTORS 19
3. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION VARIABLES 24
4. CHOW TEST 26
5. THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION DATA 28
6. THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION
COEFFICIENTS 29
7. THREE-STAGE REGRESSION VARIABLES 30
8. SEC DATA 37
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Market Power 12
2. Earnings on Equity 13
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
Defense oriented firms have been studied extensively in
the past to determine if the remuneration they receive is
commensurate with a reasonable profit level. The defense
industry is usually compared to the commercially oriented
industry as a basis in profit level studies. The importance
of equitable profit levels for defense firms is stated in
the objectives of the Defense Financial and Investment
Review , as, "Reform of federal procurement practices (are
important) to insure the effective and efficient spending of
public funds and at the same time maintain the viability of
the defense industrial base." [Ref. l:p. I-l]
Past studies of defense industry profitability have been
attacked on numerous issues. Martin in his work on
contractor risk points out, "previous studies have been
widely criticized for biased premises, nonrepresentative
samples, inaccurate data, and misleading variations in
statistical averages." [Ref. 2:p. 10] In addition to the
above inadequacies in previous studies, risk had not been
factored in as a regulator of profit until Martin broached
the risk factor in his study of the issue in An Empirical
Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984 . Martin
says.
None of the prior studies has totally reconciled the fact
that rates of return are not completely comparable for
having been earned under varying exposures to risk.
Rather than ask what defense contractors' observed rates
of return are, a more appropriate question would be
whether defense contractors are appropriately rewarded for
creative and wise risk taking. [Ref. 2:p. 10]
The purpose of this study is to expand on Martin's work
exploring the profit versus risk issue. A basis for this
exploration is the model which was constructed by Gloria
Hurdle in 1974. Hurdle's model, which analyzed a cross
section of American firms, will be adapted to analyze
commercial versus defense firms while measuring risk,
profit, and debt.
This investigation will seek a determination of profit,
or return on equity levels, for defense firms, and compare
those levels to commercially oriented industries. The
profit levels will be examined for the amount and influence
of risk involved and the effect of risk on profit levels.
B. OVERVIEW
In order to comprehend the profit versus risk relation-
ship, previous work on this relationship must be examined.
Chapter II takes a look at Martin's work on contractor risk
and Hurdle's model for measuring risk and profit.
With a solid foundation of knowledge of the profit
versus risk issue, a model for measuring these factors in
defense and commercial firms is developed in Chapter III.
The empirical formulation of profit and risk levels is
presented in what the author calls the Boger model.
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Chapter IV attempts to empirically assess the results of
the Boger model. Conclusions drawn from this assessment are
presented in Chapter V.
II. MARTIN AND HURDLE ANALYSIS OF RISK AND PROFIT
This chapter explores some of the previous work that has
been attempted in the field of risk and profit forecasting
or the explanation of profit as a factor of risk. Both
profit and risk are easily quantifiable, but as the
following studies show, they are not easily captured in a
model which makes simultaneous predictions of risk and/or
profit.
A. MARTIN ANALYSIS
Wayne Martin in his paper, An Empirical Assessment of
Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984 . "analyzed four possible
methods for the evaluation and quantification of defense
contractor risk." [Ref. l:p. 121] Martin did a mean-
variance analysis of rate of return, capital asset pricing
model, mean-variance analysis of backlog, and mean-variance
analysis of five-year defense program elements. Martin used
13 DOD oriented firms and 36 commercially oriented firms for
his data base.
Martin's objective was to quantify the relationship
between defense contractors' risk and rate of return. He
showed that while risk can be empirically assessed and rate
of return can easily be measured, the two factors do not fit
smoothly in a simple model tying the two factors of risk and
rate of return together.
10
B. HURDLE ANALYSIS
In 1974 Gloria Hurdle presented what will be called the
Hurdle model. This model is a simultaneous three-equation
regression model that looked at leverage, risk, market
structure, and profitability. Hurdle's model attempted to
explain and quantify the relationships that exist between
leverage, market structure, risk, and profitability. Hurdle
used 228 United States manufacturing firms that covered 85
different industries in the 1960 's.
Hurdle based her model on previous studies completed by
Hall and Weiss, 1967; Shepard, 1971, 1972; Stigler, 1963;
Kilpatrick, 1968; Collins and Preston, 1969; and Gale, 1972.
All of these authors "have included a risk variable or a
financial structure variable or both in a linear regression
model. They commonly represented the degree of risk by the
variability of profit over time (hereafter denoted a)."
[Ref. 3:p. 478]
According to Hurdle, stockholders are overwhelmingly
risk averters who require a higher return, a risk premium as
it were, for taking on more risk. Hurdle stated that when
using profit variability for risk, its correlation with rate
of return should be positive when the risk premium
hypothesis is used. [Ref. 3:p. 478]
Hurdle stated that "there are two major hypotheses
concerning risk and debt: (1) risk premium—high risk leads
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to high rate of return. (2) debt—requires low business
risk, but causes large financial risk." [Ref. 3:p. 478]
According to Hurdle, a businesses risk should be low
under a minimum of two conditions. The first condition is
when the industry is riskless. The second condition is when
the business has the power to maintain stable profit through
control of the industry's price or market structure.
Because of this, a third condition must be included. Market
power lowers business risk and allows for higher debt and
rate of return.
These relationships described by Hurdle are conceptually
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Figure 1. Market Power
The coefficients of these variables in a regression will
be unknown a priori regardless of the variable used to
estimate the business risk. Hurdle stated in her paper.
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The upper loop indicates a positive relationship between
business risk and return on equity, while the lower loop
indicates a negative relationship. Similarly, the
relationship between debt and profitability is unpredicta-
ble. If the bottom loop dominates then debt and profits
would be positively correlated. However, if low debt
reflects large business risk, then the upper loop implies
a negative correlation between debt and profitability.
[Ref. 3:p. 479]
Hurdle uses a graph to show how risk is related to
earnings on equity when considering two different types of
firms, one being risk averse and the other being less risk
averse.
Figure 2 [Ref. 3: p. 479] shows the earnings on equity
plotted against risk to stockholders. Curve I is the risk
averse firm, while curve II is the less risk averse firm.
Risk to stockholders includes both business and financial
risk.
Eornings on Equity
Figure 2. The Earnings-Risk Curve
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Hurdle describes the curves as:
Business risk varies from industry to industry, but it can
be partially controlled by the firm, i.e., there is large
inter-industry variation. Earnings and risk increase
together up to some maximum (points A and A'), where the
cost of debt becomes so high that earnings decrease with
further debt. This is due to the rate of interest rising
as debt increases. The firm is assumed to have a utility
function, from which it decides the point on the earnings-
risk curve which maximizes utility. The more horizontal
the indifference curves, the more averse the risk to each
firm is. Thus, the risk averse firm might choose point G,
while a less risk averse firm would prefer point B.
Curve II represents a firm with an alternative market
structure. The ability of a firm to control price should
decrease its riskiness (business risk) , which would allow
it to increase its debt (and thus increase return on
equity) without increasing risk to stockholders. Thus an
advantaged firm (one with market power) would have an
earnings-risk curve somewhat like curve II in Figure 2.
One can compare points on these two curves
representing the same debt. Consider point B of Figure 2.
This point represents some level of debt and some level of
financial risk associated with that debt. One can locate
the point on curve II corresponding to that same debt.
Since financial risk corresponding to the same debt will
be the same for both firms, but business risk will be
lower for firm II, its risk to stockholders will be lower.
Second, the earnings of firm II are higher because of its
market power, plus the lower cost of its capital. Thus,
B' (which represents the same debt as B) must lie
somewhere between points D and E.
This diagram shows the relationships among risk,
earnings, and leverage depending on the utility functions
of firms and must therefore be determined empirically.
For example, if firm I chooses point B, and firm II
chooses point C, then firm II will have higher debt,
higher earnings, and higher total risk to stockholders.
On the other hand, if firm II chooses point F, it will
have lower debt, lower risk and higher earnings. Debt,
therefore, cannot be used to measure business risk, since
both C and F have the same business risk but different
levels of debt. [Ref. 3:p. 480]
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C. EQUATIONS
Hurdle's hypotheses are that can be used to measure
total risk and that financial structure reflects an
opportunity for the businessman to increase return on
equity. She employs three dependent variables which are
risk, financial structure, and rate of return using a three-
equation simultaneous regression model to test the
hypothesis.
1. Risk
According to Hurdle, "a large market share or strong
oligopoly group should reduce business risk, because market
share is usually related to market power or the ability to
control price." [Ref. 3:p. 480] Size can be used to spread
loses which decrease . Business risk may be alleviated by
advertising intensity because it creates market power and
also because it is an expense which can be cut when profits
start to drop off.
2. Debt
"High-risk firms should have lower debt." [Ref.
3:p. 480] Hurdle also states that fast growing firms are
likely to have high debt. The reasons for this are that the
firm may be out of equilibrium due to fast or unexpected
growth. Another reason for high debt among fast growth
firms is that stockholders prefer debt for f-'nancing growth
instead of new stock issues which dilute equity.
15
3. Profits
Hurdle's premise is that, "market share and the
extent of oligopoly should be correlated with higher profits
by allowing firms some control over price." [Ref. 3:p. 480]
The equations to describe debt, risk, and profit
are:
Risk = constant - market share - advertising - assets
- concentration of market + (total assets/sales)
+ debt + demand variance
Debt = constant ± market share + growth in sales
± concentration of market ± profits - risk
+ assets + (total assets/sales)
Profit = constant + market share + advertising ± assets
+ concentration of market ± debt ± risk
D. HURDLE'S CONCLUSIONS
Hurdle's research enabled her to make a tentative
indication that while market power keeps risk at a lower
level than firms with low-market power, both high and low-
market power firms have about the same relative levels of
debt. Market structure (i.e., control over price) is the
determining factor for profit differences among similar
firms.
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III. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the data sources and methodology
used in the analysis of the data. The empirical formulation
of the data is presented in the Boger model.
A. THE DATA
The data base has its foundation in Martin's work, An
Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984
[Ref. 2]. Martin based his work on 49 different companies
for the years 1976-1984 broken into two groups consisting of
36 commercially oriented firms and 13 defense oriented
firms. The 3 6 commercially oriented firms had less than 30
percent Department of Defense sales, and the 13 defense
firms had greater than 3 percent Department of Defense
sales.
This investigation uses the same 49 companies for the
years 1976-1984 as a basis. This group of firms has been
reduced to 13 defense firms and 24 commercially oriented
firms. The reduction in commercially oriented firms is due
to the lack of backlog data for the 12 discarded firms. The
37 firms used in this work are contained in Tables 1 and 2.
Each company has nine variables used in this study which








Control Data Corporation CDA
E-Systems, Inc. ESY
Emerson Electric Company EMR
Fairchild Industries, Inc. FEN
General Electric Company GE





International Business Machines IBM
Motorola, Inc. MOT
Penn Central Corporation PC
RCA Corporation RCA







Todd Shipyards Corp. TOD
Westinghouse Electric Corp. WX
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TABLE 2





General Dynamics Corporation GD
Grumman Corporation GQ
Litton Industries Inc. LIT
Lockheed Corporation LK
Martin Marietta Corporation ML
McDonnell Douglas Corporation MD
Northrop Corporation NOC
Raytheon Company RTN
Rockwell International Corp. ROK
Sanders Associates, Inc. SAA
United Technologies Corp. UTX
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Backlog (BKLG) consists of those orders which cannot
currently be delivered but will be filled within a later
time period. Backlog data was collected from the SEC lOK
reports in the same manner as described in Martin's An
Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984
[Ref. l:p. 110].
Debt (DEBT) is defined as the total liabilities of a
firm as reported on the SEC lOK reports.
Assets (ASST) is defined as the total assets of a firm
as reported on the SEC lOK reports.
Profit variation (PVAR) is a proxy variable for risk.
PVAR is the result of taking the current year rate of return
minus the mean rate of return for the years 1976-1984 and
squaring the result.
Leverage (LEV) is the result of the current year debt
divided by the sum of current year debt and current year
shareholders' equity.
Assets divided by sales (ASSAL) is current year assets
divided by current year sales for the year in question.
Sales (SALES) are a revenue transaction where goods or
services are delivered to a customer in return for cash or
an obligation to pay. Sales figures were taken directly
from each firm's SEC lOK reports.
Shareholders' equity (SHEQ) is the owners' equity of
each firm. Shareholders' equity was taken directly from
each firm's SEC lOK reports.
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Return on equity (ROE) is the rate of return on common
shareholders equity calculated as:
_
net income after taxes ^_
^^^ ~ capital stock + sutrplus + retained earnings
B. METHODOLOGY
The methodology of the equations involved as derived
from Hurdle's model [Ref. 3: p. 481] discussed earlier in
Chapter II. Hurdle used three equations to describe risk,
debt, and profits. The three equations, with their expected
signs are described and contrasted below.
Hurdle's equation for risk is:
Risk = constant - market share - advertising - asset
- concentration of market + (total assets/sales)
+ debt + demand variance
Soger's equation for risk is:
PVAR = constant - backlog + leverage - asset
In the Boger model, backlog is used to capture market
share, concentration of market, demand variance, and
advertising used in Hurdle's equation. Debt was captured by
the same method used by Hurdle, but is called leverage in
the Boger model. Recall that leverage is the result of debt
divided by the sum of debt and shareholders' equity.
Hurdle's equation for debt is:
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Debt = constant ± market share + growth in sales
± concentration of market ± profits - risk
+ asset + (total assets/sales)
Boger's equation for debt is:
Debt = constant + backlog - return on equity - PVAR
+ asset + (total assets/sales)
Once again, market share, growth in sales, and
concentration of market are captured in backlog. Hurdle's
profit is stated in the Boger equation as return on equity.
Risk is measured by the term PVAR. The other terms in the
two equations are the same except for debt. Debt in the
Boger model is simply the current year total debt.
Hurdle's final equation is for profit.
Profit = constant + market share + advertising ± asset
+ concentration of market ± debt ± risk
The Boger profit equation is:
Return on equity = constant + backlog - leverage - asset
+ PVAR
As before, backlog was used to capture the esoteric
terms (market share, advertising, and concentration of




This chapter presents the empirical analysis and the
implications of this analysis. The methods of investigation
are ordinary single equation regression for the combined
firms, defense firms, and the commercial firms; Chow tests
on the regression of individual years, and regression of
three simultaneous equations for the combined years of 1976-
1984.
A. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION
The data contained in Table 3 show how the regressions
for the Boger model compare to the Hurdle model for the year
1984. Similar results were obtained for the years 1983-
1984. Results for the Boger model were in most cases not
statistically significant.
The following differences were observed when comparing
both defense firms and commercial firms combined to the
Hurdle model. Profit variability is reduced by the constant
factor in the Boger model for risk and is increased in the
Hurdle model. The reason is that the profit variable is a
fairly static term over the long run, and the constant is
negative to dampen out the effects of the other variables in
the equation. The Boger debt model has two variables which
differ from the Hurdle debt model. These terms are profit





ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION VARIABLES
COMBINED FIRMS
Constant + BKLG - LEV - ASST + PVAR
Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK
Boger
Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST
RISK = Constant - BKLG + Debt - ASST
Boger
Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL Hurdle
DEFENSE FIRMS
ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST + PVAR Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST
Boger
Hurdle
DEBT = -Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL Hurdle
COMMERCIAL FIRMS
ROE = Constant + BKLG - LEV + ASST + PVAR Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST
Boger
Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL Hurdle
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is a positive variable in the Boger model, while in the
Hurdle model it is negative. The reason for this is that
risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load
rather than decrease it. Hurdle found the same evidence for
the years 1960 and 1964 in her work but chose to state that
risk decreases the debt load.
Assets divided by sales have a negative influence on
debt in the Boger model while the opposite is true for the
Hurdle model. Debt is commonly employed to increase assets
which in turn increase sales. It follows then that assets
divided by sales would have a calming effect or negative
effect on overall debt.
The comparison of the Boger model to the Hurdle model on
defense firms only and commercial firms only yields the same
results as above with two exceptions. The constant in the
Boger model for defense firms for the debt equation has a
negative effect as opposed to Hurdle's positive effect.
Once again this is a dampening effect for the other
variables in the equation. The other exception is that in
the Boger risk equation backlog increases risk while in the
Hurdle risk equation backlog decreases risk. The reason for
this difference in the Boger model is that defense firms
with a large backlog are more likely to have higher risk
because of their inability to secure new contracts due to
that large backlog.
25
B. CHOW TEST ON STRAIGHT LINE REGRESSION
A Chow test was performed on the results of the
regression equation's sum of squares residuals for the
combination of defense and commercial firms, defense firms
only, and commercial firms only. The results of this Chow
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The data from the years 1976-1984 were pooled to perform
the Chow tests. Pooling was performed by combining all the
years and comparing that to the combination of previous
years plus the present year. An example makes this concept
clearer. The years in this example are 1979-1984. All of
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the data from 1979 through 1984 are combined and compared to
the data from the years 1980 through 1984 plus the data from
1979.
The Chow test showed that defense and commercial firms
are the same with respect to profit, debt, and risk with
five exceptions over nine years. In 1983 profit showed a
significant difference but risk and debt did not. In 1981
profit, debt, and risk all showed significant differences
between commercial and defense firms. This may be ascribed
to the booming defense economy and the lagging commercial
economy occurring at that time. The remaining difference is
the risk in 1978. This may be an anomaly. All five
exceptions need scrutinizing that is beyond the scope of
this work to fully understand. It is concluded that all
time series observations may be pooled with cross section
observations
.
In conjunction with the above discussion of the tests it
should be stated that a two-stage least-squares simultaneous
regression of all years combined was performed on all the
data. The results of the two-stage regression were
inconclusive
C. THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES MODEL
A regression analysis for the years 1976-1984 combined
was completed on the firms under investigation. This
regression analysis was a three-stage least squares model
performed on the three simultaneous equations for debt,
27
profit variability, and profit using the Boger model. The
analysis was completed on all firms combined, defense
oriented firms only, and commercially oriented firms only.
The data in Tables 5 and 6 compare and contrast the
differences that arose between the data bases of combined,
defense only, and commercial only firms. These differences
are discussed in the section following Table 7
.
TABLE 5
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION DATA
COMBINED FIRMS
DEPENDENT PROFIT
VARIABLE ROE VARIABILITY DEBT
Sum of Squared Residuals 19986.9 39297700 57936900
Standard Error 7.74 343.5 1319
Mean 14.7 68.4 2389.7
Standard Deviation 9.6 356.1 2607.6
R-Squared .355 .06 .743
R-Squared Adjusted .357 .07 .744
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.8 2.01 1.8
DEFENSE FIRMS















Sum of Squares Residual 13129.5 36693300 53633400
Standard Error 7.7 412.1 1575.7
Mean 13.8 74.7 2759.7
Standard Deviation 10.3 429.2 3049.1
R-Squared .42 .07 .731
R-Squared Adjusted .43 .08 .732
Durbin-Watson Stati stic 1.9 1.9 1.9
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TABLE 6
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses Below Each Coefficient)
COMBINED DEFENSE COMMERCIAL
ROE
Constant 14.5 6.1 17.6
(1.8) (3.3) (2.14
Backlog .00019 .0004 -.0005
(.001) (.0004) (.0002)
Leverage 1.12 21.5 -5.6
(3.1) (5.25) (3.5)
Assets .000058 -.0008 .0001
(.76) (.0005) (.00008)
Profit Variability -.016 -.02 -.01
(.12) (.004) (.002)
PROFIT VARIABILITY
Constant -327.1 -48.2 -418.2
(81.1) (66.8) (110.3)
Backlog -.11 .014 -.01
(.008) (.008) (.01)
Leverage 721.6 244.6 887.1
(130.3) (104.8) (176.8)
Assets -.0001 -.03 .0003
(.002) (.01) (.004)
DEBT
Constant 389.1 -421.4 564.7
(174.6) (68.9) (244.1)
Backlog .17 .013 .2
(.03) (.01) (.05)
ROE 3.13 15.1 -.17
(9.2) (2.9) (14.5)
Profit Variability- .37 .78 .41
(.45) (.16) (.6)
Assets .35 .58 .32
(.01) (.02) (.01)
Assets/Sales 33.8 . 211.4 33.9
(38.6) (25.7) (52.8)
The data contained in Table 7 shows how the Boger model
compares to the Hurdle model for the combined years 1976-
1984. It is interesting to note how closely the Boger model





ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV + SST - PVAR
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK
Boger
Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST
Boger
Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR
+ ASST + ASSAL
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK
+ ASST + ASSAL
DEFENSE FIRMS
ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST - PVAR





PVAR = -Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST
Boger
Hurdle
DEBT = -Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR
+ ASST + ASSAL
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK






ROE = Constant - BKLG - LEV + ASST - PVAR Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV + ASST Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR
+ ASST + ASSAL Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK
+ ASST + ASSAL Hurdle
for debt, while in the Hurdle model for debt, risk (profit
variability) has a negative effect. The reason for this
variance is the same as stated earlier for the least squares
regression of individual years model discussed previously in
this chapter. Risk or profit variability tends to increase
the debt load rather than decrease the debt load as Hurdle
concluded.
All other independent variables in the combined years
for the Boger models on debt, profit, and risk have the same
effects as the independent variables in the Hurdle model
.
It must be noted that profit variability for the Boger debt
model of combined firms was not statistically significant,
displaying a t -ratio of less than one.
When comparing the defense only fiirms and the commercial




ROE = Constant - BKLG - LEV + ASST - PVAR Roger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV + ASST Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR
+ ASST + ASSAL Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK
+ ASST + ASSAL Hurdle
regression is used instead of the ordinary least squares
regression described earlier in this chapter.
The constant terms in the regression equations are
discounted for their positive or negative effects when
compared to the Hurdle model. The following differences
came to light when comparing both defense and commercial
firms combined in the Boger model to the Hurdle model.
Profit variability is a positive variable in the Boger model
for debt, while in the Hurdle model for debt, risk (profit
variability) has a negative effect. The reason for this
variance is the same as stated earlier for the least squares
regression of individual years model discussed previously in
this chapter. Risk or profit variability tends to increase
the debt load rather than decrease the debt load as Hurdle
concluded.
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All other independent variables in the combined years
for the Boger models on debt, profit, and risk have the same
effects as the independent variables in the Hurdle model.
It must be noted that profit variability for the Boger debt
model of combined firms was not statistically significant,
displaying a t-ratio of less than one.
When comparing the defense only firms and the commercial
only firms using the Boger model against the Hurdle model,
the profit variability described above carries over to both
defense only and commercial only firms. In fact, the heavy
influence of the Boger debt model independent variable
profit variability in defense firms influences the combined
firms and the commercially oriented firms to a significant
degree when all three are combined.
The other exception for the defense firms is that the
Boger model has backlog increasing the risk while the Hurdle
model has backlog decreasing the risk factor. The fact that
the positive effect of backlog on risk carries over from
ordinary least squares regression to the combined years
three-stage regression further strengthens the previous
explanation of defense backlog. Namely, large backlogs are
detrimental to defense firms attempting to secure new
contracts.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The overall purpose of this study was to explore the
relationship and effects of risk to profit levels in defense
firms as compared to commercial firms. This involved a look
at the past studies of Martin and Hurdle.
Hurdle's models for debt, profit, and risk were adapted
to defense firms and commercially oriented firms in the
Boger model. This provides a tool to evaluate the
integrated relationship of profit, risk, and leverage among
defense contractors.
It has become clear from this study that models such as
Hurdle • s see the financial structure of firms in the long
run with an economic point of view. That is to say that the
market forces of the economy will tend to reach an
achievable and predictable state over a period of many
years.
The Boger model demonstrates that defense firms are
managed with a short run view of the economy. The
accounting models of the economy look at the present year
data and performance while discounting past or future
trends. This accountant's point of view has been shown by
the effect of backlog on profit variability and in turn the
effect of profit variability on the debt structure. As was
34
seen, backlog increases risk in the Boger model, and risk of
profit variability increases debt.
Defense firms must operate in a short run mode due to
the capricious nature of Department of Defense contracts and
congressional impact on operations. Because defense firms
must operate differently than commercially oriented firms,
defense firms should not be judged by the same models used
to measure profitability in commercially oriented firms.
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APPENDIX
The following table (Table 8) shows the data for the
individual defense and commercial firms. The data are
listed by firm number which corresponds to an individual
firm. The following list is used to identify the firms.
Firm # Firm Name
1 Boeing Company
2 FMC Corporation
3 General Dynamics Corporation
4 Grumman Corporation
5 Litton Industries Incorporated
6 Lockheed Corporation
7 Martin Marietta Corporation
8 McDonnel Douglas Corporation
9 Northrup Corporation
10 Raytheon Company
11 Rockwell International Corporation
12 Sanders Associates, Incorporated
13 United Technologies Corporation
14 Avco Corporation
15 Control Data Corporation
16 E-Systems, Incorporated
17 Emerson Electric Company
18 Fairchild Industries, Incorporated
19 General Electric Company





25 International Business Machines
26 Motorola, Incorporated
27 Penn Central Corporation
28 RCA Corporation







36 Todd Shipyards Corporation
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